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Prologue: Rulemaking and Court Battles 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 was a massive undertaking to 
create a “uniform national program for health insurance regulation in the United States.”2 The 
main attributes of the ACA include changing the underwritten policies of insurers, creating more 
competition in the health insurance industry, and offering health insurance protections for 
consumers.3 The ACA passed in 2010 with mixed reviews.4 Some viewed the ACA as a 
significant step forward for all Americans to have affordable health care.5 Other individuals, 
organizations, and states saw the ACA as a constitutional abomination to vanquish for reasons 
including the belief the law impeded on their right to choose not to purchase health insurance6 or 
hindrances on the practice of religious freedoms.7 Hundreds of challenges to the ACA have 
arisen since 2010, including challenges to “contradictory language” in the statute or to provisions 
such as required contraception coverage on religious grounds.8 The law has withstood the attack, 
 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C § 18001 et seq. (2018). 
2 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques 
and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 27, 27 (2011). 
3 Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 2, at ___. 
4 See Eric Carstens, Losing Our Religion: How the HHS Contraceptive Mandate Unconstitutionally Burdens 
Catholic Organization’s Free Exercise Rights, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 1 (2014) (examining the effects on Catholic 
organizations as the ACA acts as an impedance on the rights of those organizations); see Arthur Nussbaum, M.D., 
Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care Act, National Health Care Reform, a nd the 
Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate. 20 DUQ. L. REV. 411 (2012) (discussing the individual mandate); see 
Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health Care Reform Has Failed in the United States , 15 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 1 (2010) (arguing that the ACA is unsustainable and will ultimately fail); see Ezekiel J. Emanual M.D., Name 
the Much-Criticized Federal Program that has Saved the U.S. $2.3 Trillion. Hint: It Starts with Affordable, STAT 
(Mar. 22,2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/03/22/affordable-care-act-controls-costs/.; see James Hamblin, 
M.D., The Precarious Success of Obamacare, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 16, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/03/for-those-that-hate-obamacare-do-you-know-why/387913/. 
5 See e.g., Renée M. Landers, “Tomorrow” May Finally Have Arrived—The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act: A Necessary First Step Toward Health Care Equity in the United States, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 65 
(2010) (discussing how while the ACA is imperfect, the ACA is step forward for American healthcare reform). 
6 Most notably, challenges from “twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent 
Business brought suit in Federal District Court to challenge several provisions of the ACA including the individual 
mandate—which imposes a penalty on those who do have health insurance coverage—and the expansion of 
Medicaid by threatening to withdraw Medicaid funding to states if they did not increase maximum amount earned 
above the federal poverty level. See generally Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
7 See Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 514-30 (2020) 
(discussing the hundreds of lawsuits that have tried to invalidate the ACA). 
8 See Gluck, supra note 7, at ___.  
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including an attack that resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law9 in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.10 Various persons and entities continue to 
challenge the ACA, including one that could invalidate the statute because the tax for not 
purchasing health insurance is now nothing, which the Northern District of Texas held 
invalidates the entire ACA on constitutional grounds.11 
 One portion attacked is the anti-discrimination regulations in § 18116 of the ACA.12 
Under this section, an individual “shall not…be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any health program or activity, any part of 
which is receiving Federal financial assistance.”13 Section 1557 is the ACA’s anti-discrimination 
provision, prohibiting discrimination in federally funded health programs, federally-administered 
health programs, and ACA created programs like the marketplace exchanges.14 An exchange is 
“[a]nother term for the Health Insurance Marketplace, a service available in every state that helps 
individuals, families, and small businesses shop for and enroll in affordable medical 
insurance.”15 In determining which individuals the ACA’s anti-discrimination provision protects, 
the ACA looks to which groups receive protection under16 (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, also 
 
9 Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus, 567 U.S. at 588. The Court held the act to be “constitutional in part and 
unconstitutional in part.” The Court held that individual mandate that requires persons who do no t obtain insurance 
to pay a tax was constitutional under Congress’s power to tax. Id. 
10 There were five different holdings in the National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. For a detailed 
breakdown of those individual holdings see Alicia Ouellette, Health Reform and the Supreme Court: The ACA 
Survives the Battle of the Broccoli and Fortifies Itself Against Future Fatal Attack , 16 ALB. L. REV. 87, 100 (2012-
2013). 
11 See Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that counter to Sebelius that claims 
were not likely to succeed, the individual mandate was a lawful exercise of the taxing power or the commerce 
clause). 
12 42 U.S.C.§ 18116. 
13 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a). 
14 Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 
HOW. L.J. 855, 870 (2012). 
15 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Exchange, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/exchange, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
16 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a). 
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known as Title VI;17 (2) the Education Amendments of 1972, also known as Title IX, which is 
the anti-discrimination provision based on sex in an education setting;18 (3) the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975;19 and (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.20 Rather than “creat[ing] 
new bases of prohibited discrimination,” only those previously established would receive 
protection under the ACA.21 However, when the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) enacted the final rules under the Obama administration, HHS interpreted the term “on the 
basis of sex” to include both “termination of pregnancy” and “gender identity,” categories that 
none of the anti-discrimination statutes listed above protect.22 There were those opposed to the 
inclusion of new classes under § 1557 and wished to enjoin the regulation as the Plaintiffs in the 
case Franciscan Alliance Inc. v. Burwell sought to do, including a Catholic health care system 
and eight states, and individual providers.23 
Opponents of the ACA and HHS’s regulations also opposed another provision,24 
specifically a rule prohibiting denial or limitation of coverage “for specific health services 
related to gender transition if” those denials or limits of coverage “result in discrimination 
against a transgender individual.”25 This rule banned “categorical coverage exclusion or 
limitation for all health services related to gender transition.”26 HHS justified this rule by 
 
17 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2018) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin in any program or activity that receives Federal funds or other Federal assistance). 
18 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018) (this is the antidiscrimination provision 
based on sex in an education setting). 
19 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2018) (prohibits discrimination based on age in  any 
program or activity receiving Federal Financial assistance). 
20 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability about any 
program or activity receiving federal funding). 
21 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 671 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
22 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 92.4. 
23 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670. The other Plaintiffs include the states of Texas, Wisconsin, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, Arizona, Kentucky, and Mississippi. Id. at 670 n.3. The other organizations involved 
in this case as plaintiffs were Specialty Physicians of Illinois LLC and Christian Medical & Dental Associations. Id. 
at 670. 
23 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 674. 
24 See id. at 672. 
25 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(5). 
26 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b). 
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reasoning that transition services, including surgery, were now the default standard of care for 
medical professionals treating transgender persons.27 Opponents of this provision, such as 
Franciscan Alliance, Inc., a network of faith-based hospitals, expressed concerns that the 
regulation does include a minimum age requirement, meaning that insurers may have to cover 
transition services for children.28 Providers feared this provision would require them to offer and 
perform procedures they did not believe were in the best interest of any patient no matter their 
age, taking control from the medical provider.29 
 Franciscan Alliance Inc.30 and other Plaintiffs31 sued to enjoin these rules from 
enforcement. As the U.S. District Court noted, Franciscan Alliance “does not believe that 
transition related-procedures are ever in the best interests of its patients and providing or 
covering any transition-related service would violate their deeply held religious beliefs.”32 The 
medical plans of the hospital system and the other plaintiffs specifically excluded transition 
services per “their beliefs.”33 The combined plaintiffs feared the loss of millions of dollars in 
funding each year from the federal government for following their religious beliefs as not 
adhering to these guidelines would result in the loss of those revenues.34 Together the plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin 45 C.F.R. § 92.4;35 this injunction would stop protections for “gender identity” 
and “termination of pregnancy.”36 
 
27 81 Fed. Reg. at 31429. 
28 Id. 
29 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
30 According to their website this organization is “[a] trusted leader in prov iding faith-based, integrated healthcare” 
that “has stayed true to [the organization’s] founding mission to care for everyone who comes through [its] doors.” 
See FRANCISCANHEALTH, About Us, https://www.franciscanhealth.org/about-us, (last accessed Apr. 16, 2020). 
31 The other Plaintiffs include the states of Texas, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, Arizona, Kentucky, and 
Mississippi. Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670 n.3. The other organizations involved in this case as 
plaintiffs were Specia lty Physicians of Illinois LLC and Christian Medical & Dental Associations. Id. at 670. 
32 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 674. 
33 Id. at 675. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
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 HHS fought back, claiming entitlement to Chevron deference,37 which means the 
addition of gender identity and abortion status were within the scope of HHS’s rulemaking 
authority.38 HHS argued that because it is a rulemaking agency, HHS’s interpretation of the 
meaning of “sex” under the statute should persist.39 The court disagreed and held HHS lacked the 
authority to extend this definition—even when considering Chevron deference—because 
Congress did not provide HHS with the power to decide the scope and meaning of sex.40 
Additionally, the court found that Congress had not intended a shift from the original 
definition of sex in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018), 
which refers to sex binary terms, using the language “both sexes” or “one sex” throughout the 
section.41 The court reasoned that if Congress intended to expand the definition of sex under the 
ACA, Congress would have included additional protections for gender identity within the final 
text of the ACA.42 The court concluded that Congress did not intend the expansion of anti-
discrimination protections to include gender identity as a protected class.43 Interpretations of 
Title IX did not include gender identity at the time Congress passed Title IX.44 Therefore, the 
ACA uses the term “sex” as defined when Title IX became law.45 The court does not contend 
with more recent judicial interpretations of Title IX, where protections based on sex within Title 
 
37 Chevron deference describes the administrative law doctrine articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court held that a court reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute must defer to the federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous 
statute. For a more detailed analysis of this topic see GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS and ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, § 
8:47, PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L., 2nd ed. 2020; see also Kent Barnett, et al., Administrative Law’s Political 
Dynamics, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (2018).  
38 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 685 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 687. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 688. 
43 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 688 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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IX include protections of transgender students.46 
The court also found the rule was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law” because it 
did not include the religious protections expressly provided in the civil rights laws to which the 
ACA refers.47 With the reasoning discussed above,48 the court enjoined the protections under 45 
C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(4) that prohibited categorical exclusions or limitations for services related to 
gender transition.49 This injunction remains in effect today, and HHS’s Office for Human Rights 
cannot enforce these two provisions.50 A month after the court’s decision, the Trump 
Administration transitioned into power, and HHS withdrew from its pending proceedings against 
Franciscan Alliance Inc. and has not appealed the court’s decision or injunction.51 
At this stage, an appeal is impossible because of the time elapsed since the court’s 
judgment far exceeds the 30-day limit in Federal courts.52 Therefore, a new and suitable case 
must arise to change the decision in Franciscan Alliance; however, any action from HHS is 
highly unlikely under the Trump Administration, as the administration did not pursue an appeal 
of Franciscan Alliance.53 The situation is dire for transgender persons looking to receive any 
transition services because Franciscan Alliance still enjoins the final rule issued by HHS under 
the Obama Administration. Section 1557 should bar a federally funded insurer’s refusal to cover 
transition services via the other statutes to which § 1557 refers.54 
 
46 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that discrimination against 
transgender students is sex discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Educ., 845 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that discrimination against transgender persons was likely sex 
discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause). 
47 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
48 The court also discusses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  See id. 
at 691-93. 
49 Id. at 696. 
50 U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , 
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/index.html, (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
51 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5 (N.D. Tex., Jul. 10, 2017). 
52 F.R. App. P. 4(1)(A). 
53 See Price, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5.  
54 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a) (the statutes include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972). 
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This paper argues that the regulations prohibiting (1) discrimination based on gender 
identity and (2) the protection against denial of coverage for health services related to gender 
transition must be reinstated as a matter of public health policy for equitable treatment of those 
with different gender identities under the law. This paper proposes a two-tiered approach to 
reinstitute these protections. First, transition services, including surgery, should be recognized as 
medically necessary by all federally funded or subsidized insurers and as an essential benefit for 
this population.55 Second, an expansion of the definition of sex under the ACA is critical to 
provide transgender persons equal protection under the law. This goal is achievable statutorily or 
through judicial interpretation to include more than cisgender persons—those whose gender 
identity matches their biological sex.56  
A continued reinterpretation of the definition of sex under Title IX would prevent 
insurers from discriminating by refusing or specifically excluding coverage for medically 
necessary transition treatments and services.57 Statutorily, amendments to any of the statutes—
such as Title IX—that the ACA looks to regarding which classes receive protection would also 
suffice. Another possibility is reinterpretations of the definition of sex under Title VII,58 which 
applies to discrimination in the employment context, offer persuasive value. Finally, Congress 
could simply amend the ACA to explicitly offer protections for transgender persons, as one of 
the primary goals of the ACA still is consumer protection.59 
 
55 While there is some controversy surrounding children using transition services including hormones and puberty 
blockers, that discussion is for other authors and the author assumes that parental consent exists for the services. 
This paper mostly focuses on how to counteract discrimination in the insura nce place and enable payment for the 
services this population needs. 
56 Johns Hopkins defines cisgender as “a term for people whose gender identity generally matches the gender 
assigned for their physical sex. In other words, someone who does not identify a s transgender.” Linell Smith, 
Glossary of Transgender Terms, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/articles/glossary-of-terms-1. 
57 While the protections also included termination of pregnancy, such is not the focus of th is paper and is for 
discussion by other authors. 
58 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018). 
59 Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 2. 
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 This paper has five parts to illustrate the complexities and solutions to various issues. Part 
I describes the stories of individuals caught in a world where the denial of transition services has 
devastating effects. Part II defines key terms, discusses the mental health challenges experienced 
by many transgender persons, and analyzes the term gender dysphoria. Part III supplies an 
analysis of the term medical necessity, examines standard contractual language, and offers a 
review of current benchmark marketplace plans. Part IV analyzes the current state of Medicaid 
as it relates to transgender health care and shows why such protections under the ACA are 
necessary. Part V argues for reforms essential to make protections for transgender persons and 
coverage for transition services a reality for many transgender persons around the country. 
Part I: A Case Study 
 The discrimination and disparate impacts caused by the denial of transition services has a 
human cost. This section outlines multiple stories that show the effects of existing insurance 
practices on a transgender person. While this section focuses on the story of one person, Jasmine, 
this is not an uncommon problem.60 
There are troubling stories of the inability to pay for medically necessary procedures for 
transgender persons. Jasmine Glenn is a transgender woman who would call friends while 
sobbing and threatening to kill herself with the knife she gripped in her hand.61 To combat the 
desire to self-harm and to attempt to conform to what society believed she should be, a man, she 
would do “crazy” things.62 Jasmine would drink, race her car, and even jump through bonfires to 
prove her masculinity to a world that did not understand who Jasmine was.63 Jasmine’s 
 
60 See generally Emanuella Grinberg, et al., To be herself, she needs to change her body. But first, comes the battle 
with insurers, CNN, (May 31, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/31/health/transgender-surgery-
insurance/index.html.  
61 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
62 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
63 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
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alcoholism also led to multiple drunk driving arrests; she was drinking to the point of blackout.64 
 Jasmine changed in her thirties. She could accept herself as Jasmine; she could live as a 
woman but needed to transition.65 Like other transgender persons, Jasmine always had to prove 
her gender to “meet the criteria set by physicians, insurance companies, and lawmakers.”66 The 
“countless hours” spent on the phone with her insurance company or researching information 
and cases to support her push for medically necessary treatments became an all-consuming 
battle.67 
 Resilient, Jasmine began to pay for her hormones in 2012—out-of-pocket—because she 
lacked insurance to cover the necessary therapies to transition and become her true self.68 
Jasmine eventually obtained insurance coverage via Medicaid in Michigan.69 Yet, securing 
insurance began what seems like an eternal struggle—the perpetual battle to receive treatment.70 
 Once she had obtained a pre-authorization—an insurance term for preapproval—for 
vaginoplasty through appeal, she had not yet received authorization for the hair removal required 
as a prerequisite.71 By the time she had started the hair removal treatments, the pre-authorization 
for the vaginoplasty had expired.72 When she tried again, the insurer completely denied her 
claim.73 The insurer told her the surgery was—as a strict prohibition—no longer covered.74 
Jasmine continued her battle against her insurance company and depression—a side-effect of her 
gender dysphoria.75 Jasmine is not alone. The suffering that Jasmine faces is all too common.76  
 
64 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
65 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
66 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
67 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
68 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
69 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
70 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
71 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
72 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
73 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
74 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
75 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
76 See Grinberg, supra note 60. This article includes multiple examples from other transgender persons about their 
battle for insurance coverage of medically necessary services. 
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While this paper chooses to focus on Jasmine’s story, others face the consequences of 
trying to navigate current insurance practices. Derrick Robinson turned to alcohol and was only 
finally able to obtain a bilateral mastectomy following receiving a letter from his psychologist.77 
Autumn Trafficante was very careful in financially planning her transition, all the while battling 
suicidal thoughts.78 Autumn’s insurance would deny her claims, forcing Autumn to take on extra 
work, take a line of credit, and borrow from relatives to pay $70,000 for facial feminization 
surgery.79  
The problem spreads far beyond a limited choice of individuals. Sergeant Anna Lange of 
Georgia decided to undergo gender transition a few years into her marriage.80 Knowing that her 
ex-wife would move into rural Houston County, she followed to be close to her son.81 While she 
tried a different position, she went back to being a police officer in the county.82 Anna flew to 
New York after her surgeon confirmed her county insurance plan would cover the procedures.83 
Despite these assurances, she received notification that her insurer would not cover the procedure 
required.84 Stories like Sargent Anna’s; stories like Jasmine's—they barely scratch the surface of 
what is a systemic problem. The problem is partially to blame on semantics and classifications, 
which the next section explores. 
Part II: Definitions, Terms, & Mental Health 
 The harms that Jasmine and other transgender persons face when navigating the 
complexities of health insurance require background on the persons and the situations they 
 
77 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
78 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
79 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
80 Keren Landman, Fresh Challenges to State Exclusions on Transgender Health Coverage , NPR, (Mar. 12, 2019 at 
5:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/03/12/701510605/fresh-challenges-to-state-exclusions-
on-transgender-health-coverage. 
81 Landman, supra note 80. 
82 Landman, supra note 80. 
83 Landman, supra note 80. 
84 Landman, supra note 80. 
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face—and why these services are critical.85 As such, this part contains two subsections. The first 
subsection outlines some general terms and discusses why the meanings of some terms—most 
notably the meaning of the word “sex” in a legal context—needs revision to one that embraces 
gender identity as a central component. The second subsection highlights some of the possible 
procedures and services that transgender persons may need while transitioning with a spotlight 
on how mental health is always a consideration in that process. The second subsection also offers 
a brief examination of the complex issue of gender dysphoria and its necessity as a diagnosis. 
Defining gender dysphoria as a mental disorder is controversial;86 however, this paper does not 
take a stance about that controversy. 
1. Terms Regarding the Person 
A review of the terminology used by transgender persons is necessary to understand why 
transition services are medically essential to preventing harm, such as those experienced by 
Jasmine. The term transgender refers to individuals “whose gender does not match their 
biological sex at birth.”87 Gender non-conforming behaviors are those that clash with society’s 
expectation that one must fall into one of two gender roles.88 Gender non-conforming and 
transgender are not the same. A person who is gender non-conforming may not be a transgender 
person, and any transgender person may not be gender non-conforming.89 By contrast, cisgender 
persons possess both reproductive organs and the social gender assigned at birth.90 
The definition of sex is fluid and changes with context. For example, HHS’s proposed 
 
85 See Kellan Baker & Andrew Cray, Why Gender-Identity Nondiscrimination in Insurance Makes Sense , CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, (May 2, 2013), http:// cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BakerNon 
discriminationInsurance-6.pdf. 
86 See generally Walter Bockting, Are Gender Identity Disorders Mental Disorders, Recommendations for Revision 
of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care , 11 INT. J. of TRANSGENDERISM 
53, 53-62 (2009). 
87 KIMBERLY TAUCHES, Transgender, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY, 844, 844 (2009). 
88 GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender, (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter GLAAD]. 
89 GLAAD, supra note 88. 
90 B. Aultman, Cisgender, 1 TRANSGENDER STUDIES QUARTERLY, 61-62, 61 (2014) 
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rule dated May 24, 2019, states that “HHS would apply Congress’s words using their plain 
meaning when [written], instead of attempting to redefine sex discrimination.”91 The opinion in 
Franciscan Alliance states that “the term ‘sex’ was commonly understood to refer to the 
biological differences between males and females.”92 The court also states that Congress 
intended the definition of sex to refer to the two sexes as the original language from the statute 
refers to “students of one sex” or “both sexes,”93 suggesting a dichotomy that would eliminate 
the possibility of other gender identities.94 Sex under this definition is a constant and unyielding 
scientific fact—one that is inconsistent with the experiences of many persons. This rigid 
definition is a form of biologism, the belief that what distinguishes humans are biological 
factors.95 In biologism, these biological factors are “both deterministic to and the essence of 
specific human phenomena,” including both gender and sex.96 
Other definitions refer to sex as “the classification of a person as male or female. At birth, 
infants are assigned a sex, usually based on the appearance of their external anatomy.”97 This 
definition is more flexible. While our genetic evidence may classify persons into one gender, that 
does not mean that the category is immutable. Human experience is ever-changing. Some courts 
have moved to a more contemporary understandings of human experience. These courts have 
found that “transgender status and gender identity are “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
 
91 U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. – OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Fact Sheet: HHS Proposes to Revise ACA 
Section 1557 Rule, HHS.GOV 3 (May 24, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/factsheet-section-1557.pdf. 
92 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 688 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
93 Counter to the Congressional intent advocated here, the simple existence of persons born intersex —individuals 
who are not considered by medical experts as “normal” males or females—suggests such definitions of sex that 
create a dichotomy of merely male and female are complicated, and may also eliminate protections for intersex 
individuals under any anti-discrimination provision, such as Title VII. See generally Illana Gelfmann, Because of 
Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination “Because of…[Perceived] Sex”, 34 N.Y.U. 
REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 55 (2010). 
94 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687. 
95 Sari M. Van Anders, Bio/logics, 1 Transgender Studies Quarterly 33, 33-34 (2014). 
96 An also interesting note here is that biologism may also include the belief that other human experiences are 
predeterminate including race and socioeconomic status. Anders, supra note 96 at 33. 
97 GLAAD, supra note 88. 
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characteristic[s]” and “transgender people are unarguably a politically vulnerable minority.”98 
The problem with rigid definitions is that they are strict and unyielding. Whether that is 
intentional or not, rigid definitions create difficulty in seeing any other possibility. The goal is to 
overcome the tendency to limit sex to its biologic definition by offering transgender persons the 
same benefits as cisgender persons. These protections include those statutes where sex is a 
protected class, including the ACA.  
2. Mental Health, Gender Dysphoria, and the Necessity of Transition 
Transgender persons of all ages face similar adverse effects on physical and mental 
health. For transgender persons, the consequences of lack of access to such services generate 
continuous and unyielding harm. Transgender persons of any age may encounter social rejection 
by peers or family, verbal or physical abuse, increased stress, and educational difficulties.99 A 
2007 study that relied on reports from fifty-five transgender youth regarding their life-
threatening behaviors—such as suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts—73% faced at least 
verbal abuse by their parents.100 Among these difficulties, another study found that 45% of 
transgender youth had thought of killing themselves; half of those persons said that it was related 
to transgender identity.101 Other mental health concerns among transgender youth include 
anxiety, substance abuse, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression.102  
Mental health concerns are similar for adults, including the possibility of suicide ideation 
and self-harm.103 Studies have found that between 50 to 80% of transgender persons have 
 
98 F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (D. Idaho 2018) (citing Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 
(N.D. Cal. 2015)). 
99 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N TASK FORCE ON GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER VARIANCE 10 (2009), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf. 
100 Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth and Life-Threatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE 
& LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 527, 528 (2007). 
101 SUICIDE PREVENTION RESOURCE CTR., SUICIDE RISK AND PREVENTION FOR LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH 27 (Effie Malley et al. eds., 2008). 
102 Johanna Olson, Management of the Transgender Adolescent , ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLSEC. MED. 165 (2011). 
103 ERIC YARBROUGH, TRANSGENDER MENTAL HEALTH 11 (2018). 
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experienced verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, harassment, discrimination, violence, or forced 
sex.104  
Doctors may label a transgender person with a mental disorder defined in standard 
medical texts. The central “medical diagnosis,” enabling access to healthcare services and 
programs—when these services are available—is gender dysphoria. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) states that gender dysphoria “involves a 
difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, and significant 
distress or problems functioning” as a result of that difference.105 These circumstances must last 
at least six months, and the patient must show at least two of the following: 
1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary 
and/or secondary sex characteristics 
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics 
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other 
gender 
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender 
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other 
gender.”106 
 
There are separate requirements for child diagnosis of gender dysphoria.107 However, the 
outcomes are similar. The American Psychiatric Association notes that “diagnostic terms 
facilitate care and access to insurance coverage that supports mental health; these terms can also 
 
104 LAURA ERICKSON-SCHROTH, TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 
310 (Laura Srickson-Schroth ed. 2014). 
105 Ranna Parekh, M.D., M.P.H., What is Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria , (last visited Apr. 17, 
2020). 
106 Parekh, supra note 105. 
107 Six of the following must be present for at least six months and must also have “an associated significant distress 
or impairment injunction.” The factors are: (1) A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence that one is 
the other gender; (2) A strong preference for wearing clothes typical of the opposite gender; (3) A strong prefere nce 
for cross-gender roles in make-believe play or fantasy play; (4) A strong preference for the toys, games or activities 
stereotypically used or engaged in by the other gender; (5) A strong preference for playmates of the other gender; (6) 
A strong rejection of toys, games and activities typical of one’s assigned gender; (7) A strong dislike of one’s sexual 
anatomy; and (8) A strong desire for the physical sex characteristics that match one’s experienced gender.  Parekh, 
supra note 105. 
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have a stigmatizing effect.”108 This effect includes identification as being mentally ill or 
pathological.109 
Identification as mentally ill or pathological causes significant difficulties for transgender 
persons. Several psychiatric diagnostic texts classify transgender persons as having mental 
disorders, including the DSM-5 and the International Statistical Classification of Disorders 
(ICD).110 This other attempt to identify transgender persons as mentally ill or inferior carries 
with it numerous side-effects such as “stigmatization, discrimination, social exclusion, and 
transphobic violence.”111 This misleading definition of gender identity suggests to some that 
those with diverse sexual identities are somehow broken and require conversion therapy to 
“correct their deviance.”112 A natural tension exists between these two sentiments. 
The term transition is a process whereby a transgender person moves from living aligned 
with the gender assigned at birth to that of their gender identity.113 There is a misnomer that this 
process only centers around surgery; instead, it is a process each individual takes at their own 
pace; not every step needs completion.114 Some may skip hormones or surgery but take other 
steps to transition.115 Medical transition is but one possible stage in the process.116 A medical 
transition may encompass treatments and services like hormones, surgery, and mental health 
counseling.117 There are several significant surgical procedures that more closely align a person’s 
inward and outward appearance.118 The physical process can begin for minors, but the 
 
108 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Gender Dysphoria, (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/ 
Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf. 
109 Amets Suess, Karine Espinera, and Pau Crego Walters, Depathologization, 1 Transgender Studies Quarterly 73, 
73 (2014) [hereinafter Suess]. 
110 Suess, supra note 109. 
111 Suess, supra note 109. 
112 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 93. 
113 Smith, supra note 56. 
114 Smith, supra note 56. 
115 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129. 
116 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129. 
117 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129. 
118 Smith, supra note 56. 
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complexities and ethical concerns of surgery or hormones as a child with or without parental 
permission are not discussed in this paper. Other authors have thoroughly discussed those 
issues.119 This paper assumes there is no question that the minor should have access to these 
procedures, if that minor has parental consent and is about to begin their transition but encounter 
bureaucratic roadblocks of insurance that are unethical and discriminatory.120 
Another potential step in the transition process is legal transition, which includes acts 
such as a legal name change or a change of gender marker on identification.121 There is also a 
significant social component to transition that should not go unnoted.122 The timetable for 
transition can be a few months or span decades.123 This process is not an insignificant journey 
within a person’s life; for many, the journey is beneficial. A person’s quality of life improves 
when they have started the process of transitioning.124 
These situations combine the stigmatization of mental health, the concept that 
“something” is wrong, and the difficulties that transgender persons face. Even a diagnosis does 
not automatically guarantee the provision of services or coverage by one’s insurance company. 
Persons can still be denied coverage because of a specific exclusion, a procedure not being 
deemed a “medical necessity,” or for not being able to navigate a complicated appeals process—
all of these are described in the next section. Necessary to begin change and enable greater 
access for transgender persons to transition services is to (1) provide that transition care, as a 
 
119 See Federica Vergain, Why Transgender Children Should Have the Right to Block Their Own Puberty With Court 
Authorization, 13 FIU L. REV. 903 (2019); see also Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender 
Adolescents Can Access Puberty-Suppressing Hormone Treatment in the Absence of Parental Consent Under the 
Mature Minor Doctrine, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 179 (2016); see also Brendan S. Abel, Hormone Treatment of 
Children and Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria: An Ethical Analysis,” LGBT BIOETHICS: VISIBILITY, 
DISPARITIES, AND DIALOGUE, SPECIAL REPORT, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 44 (2014); see also N. P. Spack, 
Management of Transgenderism, 309 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 478 (2013).  
120 Anemona Hartocollis, The New Girl in School: Transgender Surgery at 18 , N.Y. TIMES. (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/nyregion/transgender-minors-gender-reassignment-surgery.html. 
121 Hartocollis, supra note 120. 
122 Hartocollis, supra note 120. 
123 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129. 
124 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 131. 
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mental health service, is an essential health benefit; (2) sex should include those beyond those 
who are cisgender; and (3) Franciscan Alliance should be overturned, and the original final rule 
should persist through a reinterpretation of the definition of sex. Those changes would prevent 
insurers from being able to specifically exclude or refuse to offer treatments medically necessary 
for persons to live as they see themselves. 
Part III: Insurance and Medical Necessity 
 There is a constant battle between those in health care seeking profit, such as insurers, 
and patients.125 Health insurance is big business; the industry realized net earnings of $23.4 
billion in 2018, which was a substantial increase from $16.1 billion in 2017.126 The insurers face 
a tremendous amount of growth and have an interest in accumulating profit. By contrast, 
patients, including those in transition, are concerned about themselves and their health needs. 
Still, the insurer is unwilling to provide such care or may make it difficult for the seeker of 
coverage127 to do so by overburdening them with a complicated appeals process. 
This section addresses that tense relationship in three separate subsections. The first 
subsection examines conceptions of “medical necessity,” why that seemingly harmless term 
results in the denial of coverage for many individuals and demonstrates that health services 
related to gender transition are “medically necessary“ under the ACA. The second subsection 
looks at EHB-benchmark plans—state selected plans that must include coverage of specific 
“essential benefits”128—from two states (New Jersey and New York) to examine their effects on 
 
125 Peter Ubel, Is the Profit Motive Ruining American Healthcare? , FORBES, (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:32 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2014/02/12/is-the-profit-motive-ruining-american-
healthcare/#d8b891837b97. 
126 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, U.S. Health Insurance Industry – 2018 Annual Results, 
https://naic.org/documents/topic_insurance_industry_snapshots_2018_health_ins_ind_report.pdf, (last visited Apr. 
26, 2020) (as of Apr. 26, 2020 the 2019 report is unavailable). 
127 See Grinberg, supra note 60. Sometimes the inclusions are blanket inclusions. Other times the policies are 
unclear or may say they offer services for gender reassignment, only to include other recommended treatments or 
services. Grinberg, supra note 60. 
128 45 C.F.R. § 156.111(b). 
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transgender individuals. An essential health benefit is “a set of 10 categories of services health 
insurance plans must cover under the Affordable Care Act.”129 The ten categories include but are 
not limited to mental health and substance use disorder services as well as prescription drugs.130 
The third subsection examines the regulatory path for transition procedures and services to 
become an EHB. The final section explores the insurance appeals process, analyzing that process 
and why the process is not an adequate substitute for covering transition services when 
recommended by an individual’s doctor and consented to by an informed patient.  
1. Medical Necessity 
Medical necessity is a flexible definition that can either result in denial or approval of 
coverage for treatments outside a set coverage area.131 The insurer decides whether a service is 
medically necessary and should be a covered benefit for the person asking for its coverage.132 
The doctor does not make the decision. The patient or the patient’s parent does not make the 
decision. The insurance company makes a choice. There is a natural tension between what the 
patient and doctor may both believe is the right course of treatment and the insurer’s goals. That 
decision to not cover preferred care by the insurer may reduce financial costs.133 Still, other 
economic considerations require examination as well, such as the cost to the individual denied 
coverage. 
In the 1990s, a team at Stanford University developed a model contractual language for 
 
129 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/ glossary/essential-health-benefits, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
130 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., What Marketplace health insurance plans cover, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/ glossary/what-marketplace-plans-cover, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
131 INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 28 (2012) [hereinafter EHB]. 
132 EHB, supra note 131. 
133 Actuaries, as the insurance industries determiner of what procedures costs, typically overestimate the cost 
associated with gender reassignment surgery. The primary paradigm accepted by the industry is that all transgender 
persons want gender reassignment surgery, which would be a significant financial cost. The opposite is true. Many 
transgender persons avoid such surgeries for a variety of personal reasons, including risk aversion. See J. Denise 
Diskin, Taking to the Bank Actualizing Health Care Equality for San Francisco’s Transgender City and County 
Employees, 5 Hastings Race and Poverty L.J. 129 (2008). 
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medical necessity.134 The result of this team was what became known as the “Stanford Model 
Contractual Language for Medical Necessity” for health insurance contracts.135 This model is by 
far the one most encountered during research. The language states: 
“For contractual purposes, an intervention will be covered if it is an otherwise category of 
service, not specifically excluded, and medically necessary. An intervention may be 
medically indicated yet not be a covered benefit or meet this contractual definition of 
medical necessity. A health plan may choose to cover interventions that do not meet this 
contractual definition of medical necessity.”136 
 
A few ideas are central to this language. First, insurance always reserves the ability to cover any 
or no interventions. The insurer is the one with the ultimate decision-making power—not the 
patient and not the doctor. Second, any intervention receives coverage if not specifically 
excluded and medically necessary. There are some problems with this second point. These 
treatments and services are generally either specifically excluded  or defined as not medically 
necessary. Clauses like these enable insurance companies to create a “Get Out of Covering Card” 
to avoid paying for services. 
 The American Medical Association's definition is more acceptable but still not perfect. 
Medical necessity, according to the American Medical Association, is: 
“Health care services or products that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for 
the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease or its 
symptoms in a manner that is (a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of 
medical practice; (b) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and 
duration, and (c) not primarily for the economic benefit of the health plans and 




134 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS WORKSHOP REPORT: 
STANFORD MODEL CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE FOR MEDICAL NECESSITY, 163-64, 2012 [hereinafter Stanford 
Model]. 
135 Stanford Model, supra note 134. 
136 Stanford Model, supra note 134 at 228. Other languages drop the specifically excluded language of  the Stanford 
Model. However, some of these have other language useable to exclude such as “not primarily for the convenience 
of the patient, physician or health care provider.” There is no elaboration of that language. Such language may 
prevent the use of, for example, puberty blockers for children who seek to delay puberty prior to seeking hormone 
therapies. The language could also exclude services such physical therapy in favor of invasive procedures, but that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
137 Stanford Model, supra note 134 at 228. 
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While the languages sound similar, there are several clear distinctions. First is the final 
distinction under (c). This language shows that—contrary to the Stanford Model—that the 
insurer is not the primary decision maker. This language is more patient centric as it removes the 
economic incentive from the insurer’s pocket and gives control of medical decisions back to 
patients and providers. Second, there is no language in this definition of “specifically excluded” 
procedures. This distinction is vital because it opens the possibility of payment for all medical 
purposes. The primary issue, however, is in the “illness, injury, disease, or its symptoms” 
language. Such a problem may be the result of pure semantics, but persons of different gender 
identities do not suffer from any of those listed. Those individuals merely wish for the ability to 
align their true self with their physical person. However, many have argued that transition 
therapies and services can cure or treat depression and anxiety.138 
2. ACA EHB-Benchmarks Plans 
Balancing the goal of the ACA and the reality of affordability is a constant struggle. The 
purpose of the ACA was to provide access to health insurance coverage, including through 
marketplace plans.139 The secondary goal is to keep costs low so that such coverage will remain 
affordable.140 Developing a marketplace plan is a two-step process.141 The first step is an 
examination of what “ a typical employer plan” consists of and using that plan as a baseline. 
Second, is the inclusion of the 10 categories of essential benefits into that plan, cutting and 
 
138 While plausible for hormone therapy to be a treatment for depression or anxiety, our society is not yet able to 
view non-cissexuals (including those who are pansexual and asexual) as “normal people.” Mental health care in this 
health care system in general is haphazard—but it is better than nothing. Thus, a tension exists between a label that 
should not exist and living in an “antiquated” society. See Alice Dreger, Why Gender Dysphoria Should No Longer 
be Considered a Medical Disorder, PacificStandard, (June14, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/take-gender-
identity-disorder-dsm-68308.  
139 EHB, supra note 131 at 1. 
140 EHB, supra note 131 at 12. The highlights of accessibility include affordability, ease of access, and increases in 
spending. There is an irony that some plans make it difficult for transgender persons to receive services based on 
affordability and ease of access. Even if insurers will approve an unlisted procedure, this approval is behind t he veil 
of a vague approval and then appeal process.  
141 EHB, supra note 131 at 1. 
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trimming non-essential coverages as necessary to reach cost targets.142 Marketplace plans arise 
through bridging “a typical employer plan” and ten special enumerated categories of essential 
benefits which all plans must-have.143 Each state also requires some benefits by the law of that 
state.144 
The New Jersey Benchmark Model Plan for 2020 adopts the baseline and model for what 
procedures and treatments the policy will cover. Excluded are “surgery, sex hormones, and 
related medical, psychological, and psychiatric services” for gender transition or complications 
arising therefrom.145 The model plan also only covers prescriptions for three reasons and, as 
such, would determine whether hormone treatments or other transition therapies would be 
covered for transgender persons. First is if the drug is “approved for the treatment of the Covered 
Person’s illness or injury by the Food and Drug Administration.”146 Next is if the Food and Drug 
Administration has approved it for treatment elsewhere and if one or two compendia lists the 
drug.147 Third, the drug requires recommendation by a clinical study or recommendation in a 
significant peer-reviewed professional journal.148 
In contrast, New York’s benchmark plan does not explicitly exclude transition services 
but instead does not cover any services not listed as covered in the plan.149 Any services 
regarding transition for youth or adults are not listed in the covered procedures.150 
 
142 EHB, supra note 131 at 1. 
143 EHB, supra note 131 at 1. 
144 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark 
Plans, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/reources/data-resources/ehb, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).  
145 HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF NEW JERSEY, Small Group Health Benefits Policy, 88 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data -Resources/Downloads/PA-BMP.zip, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) 
[hereinafter Horizon]. 
146 Horizon, supra note 145 at 66. 
147 More specifically, The American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information or The United States 
Pharmacopeia Drug Information . Horizon, supra note 145 at 66-67. 
148 Horizon, supra note 145 at 67. 
149 OXFORD HEALTH INS. INC., Certificate of Coverage, 61, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data -
Resources/Downloads/NY-BMP.zip, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
150 See OXFORD HEALTH INS. INC., supra note 149.  
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3. Essential Health Benefits and Section 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C) – “Other Groups” 
Including transition services as a subset of Essential Health Benefits (EHB), under the 
“other groups” definition of § 18022(b)(4)(C) would ensure plans include transition services. 
EHBs151 cover a wide range of medical services and procedures taken and developed with a 
framework that leads to potentially discriminatory results. To create the list of EHBs, HHS 
compares standard small employer plans and then issues state requirements for essential covered 
services to meet a targeted premium.152 
The language in § 18022(b)(4) defines how a service becomes an EHB and implies a 
method for transition services to achieve EHB status. Under § 18022(b)(4) are the elements 
regarding consideration for which practices and procedures become EHBs covered by a 
benchmark plan.153 The secretary of HHS must balance each of the factors so that none 
substantially outweighs another.154 There can be no discrimination because of age, disability, or 
expected length of life.155 The plans also cannot deny individuals the rights to EHBs as a result 
of their age, life expectancy, disability, or medical dependency.156 EHBs must “take into account 
the health care needs of diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons 
with disabilities, and other groups.”157 Notably, the phrase “and other groups” is unclear. This 
phrase could apply to any significant subgroup within the United States—transgender persons in 
general. Therefore, one method to provide safeguards for those looking to transition is to make 
transition services considered an EHB—these services are critical to an “other group” within the 
 
151 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Essential Health Benefits, http://www.healthcare.gov/ 
glossary/essential-health-benefits, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
152 EHB, supra note 131. 
153 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4); There are those insurance companies who specifically exclude such procedures because 
they are not part of a state’s EHB There is no incentive for such procedures when there is no one or no rule to stop 
this discriminatory practice. See Grinberg, supra note 60. 
154 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(A). 
155 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(B). 
156 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(D). 
157 42 U.S.C.§ 18022(b)(4)(C) (emphasis added). 
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“diverse segments” of the population. Allowing the provision of such services through insurance 
enables persons to become their true self. 
4. A Lack of (Effective) Appeal 
 The limitations of contractual language are significant and often protect insurers. There is 
an argument that insurers offer patients an “escape valve” of sorts through the appeals process. 
To explore this process, a detailed description of a complete procedure is below. The first 
procedural step is to file a prior authorization claim with your insurance company.158 The 
company should return judgment upon the request in writing within 15 days.159  
 A filing of an appeal must now occur. This internal appeal requires (1) completion of all 
the forms required by the insurer or a letter with proper identifying information; and (2) any 
additional information such as a letter from a doctor.160 The appeal must be filed within 180 days 
of the receipt of rejection but can then require an external appeal.161 The insurance company then 
has another 30 days to approve or reject paying for the requested care.162 There does not appear 
to be an incentive for the insurance company to expedite this process for non-emergency care. 
 The external review becomes possible after the denial of the internal review, which could 
be as many as 225 days after the first request. The written request for external review must be 
filed within 120 days of the denial via internal review.163 Some states have their own appeals 
process, of which there is up to a $25.00 fee to file the appeal.164 The only possible objection 
 
158 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Internal Appeals, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/appeal-insurance-company-decision/internal-appeals/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
[hereinafter Internal Appeals]. 
159 Internal Appeals, supra note 158. 
160 Internal Appeals, supra note 158. Healthcare.gov recommends keeping all paperwork and documenting all 
interactions with the insurance company, whether by phone, email, letter, and so forth. Internal Appeals, supra note 
150. 
161 Internal Appeals, supra note 158. 
162 Internal Appeals, supra note 158. 
163 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., External Review, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/appeal-insurance-company-decision/external-review/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
[hereinafter External Review]. 
164 External Review, supra note 163. 
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raiseable in this circumstance is “[a]ny denial that involves medical judgment where you or your 
provider may disagree with the health insurance plan.”165 As such, the review process may end 
here for the majority of those seeking transition services. 
 The Stanford Model Contractual Language and similar models put the dead -end here in 
the appeals process. The process limits the options of the patient when an insurer considers a 
procedure or service not medically necessary. If the patient can navigate the complicated 
process, any specifically excluded claim is not eligible for the appeals process. The insurance 
company also has no incentive in approving any procedure that they do not consider medically 
necessary. Most persons would surrender upon discovering the time required for this drawn-out 
process and, for low-income individuals, the possibility of having to pay to file. Therefore, the 
appeals process is ineffective for those seeking transition via insurance coverage for required 
services. 
 The most practical solution to guarantee coverage of such services to transgender 
individuals is to side-step these contractual and bureaucratic walls and other hurdles to treatment. 
However, rather than offering a human-friendly solution to a well-established problem, the 
current legal frameworks offer a mixed bag for those dependent on government protections. 
Those protections initially offered are on perpetual hold, and even those who rely on government 
assistance in the form of Medicaid have no options based on one thing: where they live.  
Part IV: Medicaid 
 Just like private insurers, not all is perfect within government-funded and determined 
health care programs. Medicaid is a joint federal and state-funded program administered by the 
various states.166 States rules can vary. Some states do not offer coverage for transition services 
 
165 External Review, supra note 163. 
166 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
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at all. While other states cover transition services, there are battles in states like Wisconsin and 
Iowa over the coverage of such services. The needle is moving toward a more inclusive future. 
1. States That Do Not Offer Medicaid Coverage 
Medicaid is an essential provider of health care services to transgender persons because 
transgender persons are more likely to depend on Medicaid coverage.167 A large number of states 
either have no explicit policy concerning transgender health coverage or specifically exclude it in 
their state employee benefit plans. Of the fifty states, ten explicitly exclude transgender care and 
health care coverage from their state Medicaid plan.168 Twelve states expressly prohibit 
transition-related care coverage in their state employee health plan.169 Tennessee, for example, 
includes “sex change or transformation” surgery specifically in its list of ninety-one stated 
exclusions for coverage in its Medicaid program.170 Despite these exclusions, there are battles in 
some states to determine the constitutional legitimacy of such exclusions. One such state is 
Wisconsin. 
2. Battleground: Wisconsin - Flack 
Wisconsin is a battleground where injunctions have foiled the state's pure ban on 
 
167 See CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL., PAYING AN UNFAIR PRICE: THE FINANCIAL PENALTY FOR BEING 
TRANSGENDER IN AMERICA, (2015). This publication supplies several reasons why transgender persons encounter 
financial difficulties, which places these individuals in the lower income bracket required for Medicaid coverage. 
Reasons provided include (1) employment discrimination forces transgender workers into lower paying jobs or 
unemployment; (2) housing discrimination results in quoted higher prices or housing, which could lead to higher 
expense or living in less desirable areas; (3) cost increases resulting from extended housing searches; (4) delayed 
and thus more costly medical care as preventative care is delayed or avoided due to cost; (5) the costs of transition 
related care, such as annual hormone or lab test costs; (6) borrowing money to pay for healthcare expenses; (6) loss 
of productivity and employment because employment opportunities may not provide sick leave; (7) more expensive 
lending due to employment difficulties and increased encounters to law enforcement can affect interest rates and 
lead to unfair lending practices; (8) difficulty obtaining credit to support education expenses, business start -up 
expenses, or other expenses such as housing; (9) higher costs associated with filing and processing fees for identity 
documents; (10) refusal to supply identity documents to transgender persons; (11) lack of proper identification 
prevents employment opportunities; (12) harmful school environments leading to dangerous situations and 
decreased academic performance and graduation rates, leading to less employment opportunities; and (13) inability 
to access financial aid for further educational opportunities. 
168 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, Healthcare Laws and Policies, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies, (last visited April 26, 2020) [hereinafter MAP]. 
169 MAP, supra 168. 
170 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-13-13-.10 (2020). 
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transgender services and surgery, most notably in Flack v. Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services.171 Flack was decided in 2019 and held that the provisions of Wisconsin Medicaid for 
both gender-conforming surgery and hormone therapies violated (1) the Affordable Care Act;172 
(2) the Medicaid Act;173 and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.174 
In this case, two transgender individuals with gender dysphoria challenged an exclusion 
for medically prescribed gender-conforming surgery and related hormones under Wisconsin 
Medicaid.175 The court found that the regulations originally were developed under the guise that 
such procedures were costly.176 The Wisconsin Department of Health Services (WDHS) then 
could not provide any evidence as to how the procedures were experimental, ineffective, or 
unsafe.177 Beyond this case, such an argument is questionable since sex assignment surgeries for 
infants are so safe that even states have elected to force the surgeries upon young infants.178 
Counter to WDHS’s argument, even those who make the appeal decisions found the provision 
lacking.179 Those persons “acknowledg[ed] that gender-conforming hormone and surgical 
 
171 See Flack v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1003 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
172 Id. at 1014-15. 
173 Id. at 1019. 
174 See id. at 1020-22 
175 Id. at 1003. 
176 Id. at 1008 
177 See Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.  
178 Such an argument is questionable given that there are examples that exist, such as in M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. 
Amrheim, 598 Fed.Appx. 143 (4th Cir.2015). where intersex infants do not choose to have surgery. The adults ma ke 
the choice. In M.C., a  family was to adopt the infant. Before the adoption, M.C. remained in custody of the State of 
South Carolina. During that time, state actors decided M.C. needed to have gender reassignment surgery. The state 
actors and the doctors performed the procedure to make M.C. “male.” Ironically, the state chose M.C.’s sex through 
a surgery that in other contexts, such as the views of the Wisconsin Department of Health, are unsafe and 
experimental. Just five years later, the South Carolina legislature is currently considering a bill called the Youth 
Gender Reassignment Prevention Act, which subjects health care professionals to the threat of license revocation to 
practice. H.R. 4716, 123d Sess. (S.C. 2020). Among the provisions of this act—in addition to the suppression of 
treatments such as surgeries and puberty blocking hormones—the proposed legislation also prevents “interventions 
to align the patient’s appearance or physical body with the patient’s gender identity” and “interventions to alleviate 
symptoms of clinically significant distress resulting from gender dysphoria.” Id. The bill ends the surgical part of 
transition, but medical professionals may not advise those with gender dysphoria to dress in conformity with their 
identified gender. Id. This bill may also prevent treatment for depression as it relates to gender dysphoria. Id. 
Conflictingly, the bill allows mental health counseling. Id. Drug therapies are plausibly “interventions to alleviate 
symptoms.” Id. 
179 Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. 
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treatments for gender dysphoria can be medically necessary and that the [current exclusion] 
conflicts with current medical practice.”180 The same surgeries and medications were covered to 
treat other conditions,181 including the use of hormones.182 
The court regarded WDHS’s arguments that the ACA antidiscrimination provisions do 
not apply in this case as “nonsense;” those arguments do not need examination.183 However, the 
court dwelled on whether WDHS had the power under the Medicaid Act to exclude such services 
as medically unnecessary using an argument based on Fifth Circuit law that experimental 
procedures could be medically unnecessary.184 The court decided that this is an antiquated ruling 
from 1980 and that the medical profession “has reached a formal consensus as to the safety and 
efficacy of surgical treatments for severe gender dysphoria.”185 The court concluded that “the 
state’s adoption, or at least continued enforcement, of the Challenged Exclusion is unreasonable 
as a matter of law and not entitled to deference.”186 The court barely addressed the Equal 
Protection issue other than to say that both parties agreed that heightened scrutiny applied, and 
there was no apparent benefit to public health from the exclusion.187 
While Flack does not address most of the issues with completeness as the arguments of 
the opposing side were lacking, there are at least two critical takeaways from this case. First, the 
parties here both acknowledged that transgender persons are a quasi-suspect class and, therefore, 
any analysis under the Equal Protection Clause would warrant heightened scrutiny. Second is the 
 
180 Id. 
181 Cf. Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties , 29 Harv. J.L. 
& Gender 51, 60-62 (2006) (discussing that such procedures for the intersex, and particularly infants, are routine and 
encouraged in many places). 
182 Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1009-10. 
183 Id. at 1014 
184 Id. at 1015 
185 Id. at 1015-16 (citing Lankford v, Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a state has discretion 
to determine optional services, but a state’s failure to provide coverage for services that are non-experimental, 
medically necessary is per se unreasonable and inconsistent with the stated goals of Medicaid). 
186 Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1018. 
187 Id. a t 1023. 
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notion that an insurer should cover a service or procedure if it is non-experimental, safe, 
effective, and recognized as the proper standard of care. This case from Wisconsin moves the 
needle as to where the law needs to go to ensure proper protections for transgender persons in 
receiving the care they need, should they opt for that care. To continue to deny these transition 
therapies to a wide range of community members is not only a tragedy; such denial is unethical. 
3. Battleground: Iowa 
Iowa’s provisions of coverage for transition services through Medicaid is a political war. 
In March 2019, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the state’s previously stated exclusion of 
transgender health coverage was a violation of the state’s civil rights law and, thus, illegal.188 In 
this case, the Iowa legislature had amended the Iowa Civil Rights Act to add “gender identity” to 
protected characteristics.189 The Iowa Supreme Court determined whether or not that language of 
the prohibition of surgical procedures related to “gender identity disorders” was a violation of the 
statute or the Iowa Constitution.190 The defending agency argued that all Medicaid beneficiaries 
in Iowa were not entitled to gender-affirming surgical procedures because they are performed 
primarily for psychological issues.191 The court held the opposite. The plan denied coverage 
because they were for the purpose related to gender identity, which would be a violation of the 
Iowa Civil Rights Act.192 The Iowa Supreme Court did not discuss the constitutional issue 
because the statute banned discrimination.193 
The legislature did not surrender in response to this decision. Just two months later the 
governor signed a bill into law that allows Medicaid and other state-funded health care providers 
 
188 Good v. Iowa Dep’t. of Human Servs., 924 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 2019). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 862. The court notes that this is only because the surgeries are related to transsexualism. There are surgeries 
performed for other psychological reasons that the Medicaid plan covers. 
192 Id. 
193 Id.  
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to exclude transgender-related care.194 This gap leaves the possibility of even gender-affirming 
care, let alone hormones or surgery, in doubt for citizens in Iowa.195 While Iowa law continues to 
protect civil rights for transgender persons in some ways (most notably, housing and 
advertising), the law specifically excludes transgender persons from receiving surgery.196 It 
specifically provides that “This section shall not require any state or local government unit or 
tax-supported district to provide for sex reassignment surgery or any other cosmetic, 
reconstructive, or plastic surgery procedure related to transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender 
identity disorder or body dysmorphic disorder.”197  
Such language is a blatant, direct, and overt act to exclude this quasi-suspect class from 
potential violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Transgender persons are a 
quasi-suspect class because (1) transgender persons have been subject to a long history of 
discrimination that continues to this day; (2) transgender status as a defining characteristic bears 
no relation to perform or contribute to society (3) transgender status and gender identity have 
been found to be obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics; and (4) transgender 
people are unarguably a politically vulnerable minority.198 While this view is thus far in the 
minority, it is gaining some momentum. Circumstances like those in Iowa illustrate the need for 
the judicial adoption of an expanded definition of sex to provide protections to transgender 
persons as already exist for cisgender persons. The change in judicial interpretation would also 
stop the war in states like Wisconsin and Iowa. There is no reason that a state should have the 
power to target and exclude a specific procedure based on a person’s gender identity. 
 
194 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, Healthcare Laws and Policies: Medicaid Coverage for Transition-Related 
Care, https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-medicaid.pdf, (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Medicaid 
Coverage]. 
195 See Medicaid Coverage, supra note 194. 
196 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (West 2019). 
197 F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1144 (D. Idaho 2018) (citing Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 
134 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
198 Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139-140 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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Discussed below are the problems requiring resolution to move the needle toward 
adequate protections for transgender persons in their health coverage; their resolution would 
enable transgender persons to have access to the care that they need. Whether these human 
beings decide they want to transition, are transitioning, or are looking to take another step in that  
process, they deserve and are entitled to medical treatment that is necessary to enable them to 
live as they truly are. 
Part V: Legal Transitions and Changes 
 While the situation for transgender persons may seem bleak, there exist some simple yet 
difficult changes necessary for the law to protect this population and guarantee them the essential 
services they need. This part examines those necessitated changes in two subsections. The first 
explores legislative and regulatory ways to offer protections to transgender persons through 
neutralizing the “medically necessary.” The second discusses judicial transformation and better 
interpretations of the definition of sex than the weak reasoning found in Franciscan Alliance. 
1. Transforming “Not Medically Necessary” into “Totally Medically Necessary” 
As shown above, insurers can discriminate with too much ease. The problem stems from 
insurers looking out for their bottom line or relying on age-old prejudices to keep transgender 
persons from continuing their transition journey. Individuals, like Jasmine, find themselves 
caught in unnavigable web of legal and bureaucratic hindrances to their needs and goals. The 
systems presently permitted by the language of § 1557 as it currently stands enable 
discrimination to perpetuate, whether covert—such as in the insurance appeals process—or 
overt—as in explicit bans in Medicaid programs. 
Recognition of transition services as medically necessary is critical. While data is not 
obtainable at present, the other costs associated with lack of transition treatment, including 
treatments for other conditions such as depression, should receive adequate consideration. The 
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coverage of these services may reduce or eliminate added costs. There would also be a gain in 
human value as treatment may provide a way to prevent persons from taking more drastic and 
violent steps. As Jasmine recounted, she was consistently suicidal. There is a value to all human 
life. 
Categorizing transition services as an EHB would require coverage of services related to 
transition. One might think EHBs include transition services and procedures already. One of the 
main EHB categories is mental health of which coverage is required in all market-place based 
plans.199 The same is true for Medicaid Plans.200 However, even some of the “model” 
marketplace plans—even from liberal states like New Jersey—have many impediments to 
transition services. Still, states like Wisconsin in Flack try to argue that “it has always been this 
way.” Unfortunately for the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, times change to the point 
where procedures are no longer experimental but standard, prescriptions such as hormone 
therapies are standard treatments for other patients, and even the persons denying the claims 
made by transgender persons do not understand why such care is not covered .201 Even though 
gender dysphoria is a “mental health disorder,” transition services and procedures do not receive 
the same coverage as other mental health services; coverage for gender dysphoria should receive 
the same protections as other designated mental health conditions. A quick edit to the end of the 
Mental Health essential benefit to add “including transition services” should suffice.202 
The fastest way to enable this transformation from a rigged system into one that allows 
positive human experiences and growth is through legislation. Legislative action at the Federal 
 
199 U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, What Marketplace health insurance plans cover, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/what-marketplace-plans-cover, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
200 Sarah Rosenbaum, et al., Medicaid Benefit Designs for Newly Eligible Adults: State Approaches , THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 11, 2015, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2015/may/medicaid-benefit-designs-newly-eligible-adults-state-approaches.  
201 Flack v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
202 This need not implicate health care providers from not providing services because of their religious beliefs. The 
effects of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act are outside the scope of this paper. 
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level in the current political climate seems unlikely. However, advocacy at the local level for 
change can be useful for many. New Jersey has a model statute for contracts for insurance 
companies that offer health coverage—even though this statue relates to inmates' health care.203 
This statute prevents insurers from “denying or limiting coverage, or denying a claim, for 
services including but not limited to the following, due to a covered person's gender identity or 
expression or for the reason that the covered person is a transgender person.”204 Such a statute, if 
extended to all and not just inmates, would significantly knock down walls to treatment for 
transgender persons seeking transition. Currently, nineteen states and The District of Columbia 
have laws or mandates against blanket exclusions for gender-affirming treatment in benefits 
packages.205  
As a global example, Argentina is an effective model for the way legislation needs to 
shift to enable effective and necessary transitions. In 2012, Argentina led the way in developing 
the rights of transgender persons in ways that no nation before it had done.206 With unanimous 
Senate support, the law in Argentina now (1) allows a person to change their gender on official 
documents without surgery or psychiatric diagnosis and (2) requires public and private medical 
professionals “to provide free hormone therapy or gender reassignment surgery for those who 
want it—including those under the age of 18.”207  
With such legislative changes, “medically necessary” loses its teeth, and the complex 
processes or specific exclusions no longer work. Such would be a boon for those seeking 
transition services. 
 
203 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:7E-7 (West 2017). 
204 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:7E-7(b)(4) (West 2017). 
205 Grinberg, supra note 60. 
206 Emily Schmall, Transgender Advocates Hail Law Easing Rules in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2012, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/americas/transgender-advocates-hail-argentina-law.html.  
207 Schmall, supra note 207. 
Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts 
34 
 
2. Solidifying the Definition of Sex 
The evolving definition of sex within Title IX could help save § 1557 if courts continue 
to move in that direction. Franciscan Alliance held that under Title IX, the original language of 
the statute that supplies the definition off sex, protections are limited to those who are 
cisgender.208 However, the statute is almost fifty years old.209 Interpretation within a modern 
context should be used adapt this out-of-date definition to a contemporary meaning. The law is a 
living, breathing thing. One cannot consume oneself with “what it was in the past” while 
ignoring the present or future. Society learns, grows, and adapts. That is not to say the law 
should continuously shift as the country requires some consistency; however, that does not mean 
that laws and interpretations are immutable. Even the Supreme Court has overturned itself 
before, such as Brown v. Board of Education overturning Plessey v. Ferguson.210 The language 
in Brown v. Board even acknowledges that new knowledge and “modern authority” change 
meaning and interpretation of the law.211 Therefore, the definition of sex within the Title IX 
context could change to match more contemporary meanings and interpretations. Changes to the 
standard of medical care for transgender persons—as noted in Flack, which also recognizes the 
scientific and social shifts212—are comparable evidence to the psychological evidence in Brown 
v. Board.213 Science and social change evolve meanings into contemporary ones. The judiciary 
lives; the judiciary cannot remain in 1972 forever. 
Several cases support this movement within the Title IX context. For example, in Grimm 
v. Gloucester County School Board, the judge held that claims of discrimination based on 
transgender status were per se actionable under Title IX, which warranted the claim to be 
 
208 Franciscan Alliance. Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 687 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
209 The 50-year anniversary of the statute is 2022 because the statute became law in 1972. 
210 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan ., 347 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1954). 
211 See id. 
212 Flack v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
213 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan ., 347 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1954). 
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reviewed via intermediate scrutiny.214 Such holdings have several possible ramifications, all of 
which should occur under the law.215 First, gender identity would be a protected class under the 
category of sex, as listed as Title IX. Second, as a result of that categorization, § 1557 would 
inherit “transgender” as a protected class; however, prospective plaintiffs such as Franciscan 
Alliance Inc. would highlight that the court in Franciscan Alliance already stated the original 
definition controls. The issue is one of interpretation, and whether as the ties change statutes can 
take on new meanings. While not necessarily statutory, Brown v. Board provides a framework 
for this. In Brown v. Board psychological impacts on the “separate but equal” policy swayed the 
Court’s reasoning to change how the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment.216 Here, a 
similar concept could apply. The definition of sex could change depending on new ways of 
thought and thinking. The court in Flack recognized this fact, and the persons denying the 
approval requests for transgender patients in Wisconsin realized that times change. Battles must 
end; there must be movement forward. 
 Finally, those protections offered under the law subject any review to intermediate 
scrutiny. Subjecting reviewed laws to intermediate scrutiny means that programs like Medicaid 
would have to show that the policies were more than merely rationally related to the outcome.217 
Here, there is no such relationship. There may be more monetary savings, should that be the 
state’s logic, in providing coverage for transition services rather than ongoing and potentially 
expensive mental health treatment. The movement to intermediate scrutiny would be a boon for 
transgender persons. As Title IX would also adopt that definition, gender identity would become 
 
214 Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
215 For similar holdings, see also Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenisha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034 (7th Cir. 2017); see also A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536 (M.D. Pa. 2019); see also 
Adams by and through Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty, Florida , 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2018); see 
also Evancho v. Pine Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017). 
216 See Brown v. Bd., 347 U.S. at 484-8. 
217 U.S. v. Virginia , 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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protected under § 1557, affording transgender persons all the protections they had before the 
Franciscan Alliance injunction, including protections in marketplace plans. 
Such guarantees within coverage would be a boon for transgender persons. People like 
Jasmine, frustrated by their insurance company repeatedly, could receive their benefits without 
having to try to navigate a complex system. Mental health issues that surround the population of 
transgender persons in the United States would decrease. There is nothing but positive outcomes. 
The definition of sex should encompass gender identity rather than being a mere “biological” 
definition. Life is not that black and white. 
Since 2010, various circuit courts have decided cases in favor of transgender persons218 in 
the employment related context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964219 or on another 
basis. While not mentioned in the ACA itself, there are potential ramifications and spillover of 
the definition of sex from Title VII. A new definition of sex under Title VII would have 
significant persuasive value to the interpretation of sex as it relates to Title IX and the ACA. If 
Title IX’s definition of sex was to match the new definition of sex under Title VII, the ACA 
would offer protections like those under the original final rule issued by HHS, which included 
gender identity. 
The Supreme Court has already heard arguments in a landmark case that could have 
broad implications for the rights of transgender individuals beyond its Title VII question. On 
April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
 
218 See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that terminating 
employer based on transgender status or on the basis of transitioning violates Title VII); Glenn v. Brumbly, 663 F.3d 
1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that termination of employee based on bathroom concerns, transgender status, and 
transitioning was sex-based discrimination and violated Equal Protection under the Constitution); Whitaker v. 
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that discrimination against transgender students 
is sex discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., 845 F.3d 217 
(6th Cir. 2016) (holding that discrimination against transgender persons was likely sex discrimination under Title IX 
and the Equal Protection Clause). 
219 This part of the Civil Rights Act prevents discrimination in the workplace. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1974 (2018). The ACA does not specifically mention this part of the Civil Rights Act. The ACA does specifically 
mention Title VI and Title IX. 
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Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al., to answer “[w]hether Title 
VII prohibits discrimination against people based on (1) their status as transgender [and] (2) sex 
stereotyping.”220 Oral arguments were heard on October 8, 2019,221 and the Court has not yet 
rendered a decision. The answer to these questions has broad ramifications. Answering the first 
question in the affirmative significantly alters the landscape for other civil rights provisions such 
as Title IX. If yes, it is more than plausible that the same expansive protected status would 
expand the definition of sex in Title VII. Should that happen, Title IX would offer protections for 
transgender persons under the definition of sex. Expanding the definition of sex under Title IX 
carries those same protections into the ACA and § 1557.222 The long tragedy would be over, as 
protections would be offered to transgender persons and the services they require in all federally 
funded programs including insurers offering market-place based plans and Medicaid. Not 
medically necessary would transform into medically necessary, and persons like Jasmine would 
not have to fight excruciating battles to get the services they need.  
Epilogue 
 The problem facing transgender persons when battling discrimination is disheartening. 
Ethically, the right thing to do—the just thing to do—is to move the needle in such a way to offer 
protection to these individuals, whether child or adult, looking for surgery or not looking for 
surgery. Something must change. The definition of sex must encompass gender identity. There 
must be statutory protections, whether on a state or federal level. This tragedy cannot go on any 
further. Transgender persons should have the chance to be who they are and receive the same 
protections as cisgender persons under the law. The judiciary must reinterpret, or the legislature 
 
220 Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc , 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Mem) (2019). 
221 See Transcript of Oral Argument, R.G. and G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 139 S.Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107). 
222 Should these events not occur, the alternative is legislative action through Congress as a check on the Supreme 
Court decision. 
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must rewrite; the battles must cease. 
